"It is now clear to most Israelis that the relative quiet they enjoyed for the last year or so was not due to their army's military prowess. It was due to the Palestinian ceasefire, observed above all by Hamas's military arm, Izzeddin El-Qassam (IQ). Since it was renounced, 200 mortars have been fired into Israel, four soldier abductions have been attempted or carried out and two soldiers and one settler have been killed."
[It will also be clear to most Israelis that Ariel Sharon was a rare individual even when compared only to that small group of generals who try their hand at politics. He was a far better general than, say, Colin Powell. Brilliant, ideosyncratic, equivocal, brutal. And he was a more successful politician than--well, than most generals. He did get away with nearly all of his war crimes, acts of insubordination and deceit against his superiors. It's true he was forced to resign as Defense Minister after the inquiry into Sabra and Shatilla. But even there, he was the individual who made "facts on the ground" a household phrase.
On the other hand, Ehud Olmert is municipal politician who was immodest enough to inherit The Master's most ambitious endgame. Netanyahu wouldn't have done any better. He has the vanity and the lawlessness, but he lacks the core warrior's skills. Netanyahu was a captain in a country with enough generals to form a government, and enough left over to form the opposition. Both Netanyahu and Olmert lack the operational practice to get away with "floating like a butterfly," so we will probably see a lot of "stinging like a bee." That can have a devastating effect on the home folks, especially after the first monotonous wave of exhaustion rolls through. -jlt]
There are four aims behind operation "Summer Rain", the Israeli army's latest invasion of Gaza, according to ministers, officers and analysts. The first is to free "unconditionally" Gilad Shalit, the Israeli soldier captured by Palestinian guerrillas just outside the Strip on 25 June. The second is to end Palestinian "rocket fire" that, in the last month, has peppered Sederot and other Israeli areas on the Gaza border, so far without serious injury.
The third aim -- undeclared but acknowledged -- is to force the Palestinian government from office via a rising curve of pre-emptive strikes. So far this has included tightened economic and political blockades, destruction of civilian power plants and bridges, military re-occupation, rocket attacks on the prime and interior ministers' offices and the wholesale arrest of Hamas ministers, members of parliament and local authority officers.
The ouster has little to do with the government's refusal to recognise the legitimacy of the Jewish state -- a rejection that suits Israel since it frees it from having to deal with an elected Palestinian Authority. It has more to do with Hamas's success not only in surviving the siege but in enshrining resistance as a central policy in its and any future National Unity Palestinian government, courtesy of the recently agreed Prisoners' Document.
The fourth aim is to repair the battered status of Israel's "deterrence". It is now clear to most Israelis that the relative quiet they enjoyed for the last year or so was not due to their army's military prowess. It was due to the Palestinian ceasefire, observed above all by Hamas's military arm, Izzeddin El-Qassam (IQ). Since it was renounced, 200 mortars have been fired into Israel, four soldier abductions have been attempted or carried out and two soldiers and one settler have been killed.
Threats Hamas may now take the fight "deep into Israel" reminds most Israelis of the bloodiest days of the Intifada. It destroys the illusion that the Gaza disengagement was somehow a military success. And it casts Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's project to determine unilaterally Israel's eastern border as absolute folly.
"The continuation of Palestinian attacks from the Gaza Strip (has) convinced Israelis the same thing will occur in areas in the West Bank which are evacuated under Olmert's realignment plan," says Israeli analyst Daniel Ben Simon. "In such a context, the plan loses all legitimacy."
Israel's means of restoring "deterrence" is to threaten and perhaps deliver a mighty blow in Gaza, on regime and people alike. Its quandary is that each one of the aims -- and the means intended to achieve them -- contradicts the other.
Save for the unlikely case of an Entebbe-like raid, it is difficult to see how Shalit can be recovered from Gaza except through negotiations, as has always been the case in the past. Hamas -- political and military men alike -- is aware of the history. "Hamas wants a deal similar to what Hizbullah achieved in January 2004 when Israel freed 400 Palestinian prisoners in return for Elhanan Tennenbaum and three dead soldiers," said Hamas MP, Mushier Al-Masri, last week.
This week IQ, the Popular Resistance Committees and the Islamic Army (the three militias holding the soldier) gave voice to a Hizbullah-like demand: Shalit will be freed only in return for the freedom of 1,000 Palestinian prisoners, including the old, the sick, women and children. "The occupation must understand the resistance factions are serious in this matter," said Abu Obeida, IQ spokesman.
The same logic applies to the rocket fire. Ever since the first mortar was fired into Israel from Beit Hanoun in 2001, the Israeli army has been invading and reinvading Gaza to take out the launchers. Hundreds of acres of land have been razed, hundreds killed, homes destroyed and thousands displaced from their homes. And, after every incursion, the mortars have returned, as they will do after this one.
The only way "pacification" might come is if the army were to remain permanently in Gaza or, in the phrase of Sederot mayor Eli Moyal, if Beit Hanoun were to be rendered permanently "uninhabitable". The first is impossible domestically, since it refutes the purpose of disengagement. The second is impossible internationally. However much the US may support the toppling of Hamas it cannot tolerate the expulsion of 20,000 Palestinians in reprisal for mortars that haven't killed an Israeli in over a year.
The only way the mortars will end is in the context of a mutually-binding ceasefire -- in which Israel also lifts its blockades, stops the rocket attacks and ends the so far sonic bombardments. And the only way that can be brokered is in negotiation with Hamas. But Israel will not negotiate. "Israel will not give in to extortion by the PA and the Hamas government, which are led by murderous terrorist organisations," said Olmert's office on Monday.
The result is a process where the balance of power in Gaza is swinging from Hamas' political to its military leadership. Of all the constituencies in the movement, IQ was the most cynical regarding the turn to politics, believing (accurately it seems) that democracy under occupation is an oxymoron. The militias also have the least to lose from the PA's collapse, since they have never been dependent on it for their arms and kudos. For them Israel captive in Gaza licenses the end of the ceasefire and return to armed resistance, not only there, but against Olmert's deepening occupation in the West Bank.
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