David Albright, "When could Iran get the Bomb?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2006 pp. 26-33 (vol. 62, no. 4).

If Iran had started to build a clandestine plant with 1,500-1,800 centrifuges in early 2006, it could assemble enough additional usable machines in about 15-18 months, or by about mid-2007. It would need to assemble centrifuges at the upper limit of its past rate, about 70-100 centrifuges per month, to accomplish this goal. In the meantime, Iran would need to identify a new facility where it could install the centrifuge cascades, since it is unlikely to choose Natanz as the location of a secret plant. It would also need to install control and emergency equipment, feed and withdrawal systems, and other peripheral equipment. It would then need to integrate all of these systems, test them, and commission the plant. Iran could start immediately to accomplish these steps, even before the final testing of the 164-machine cascades at Natanz, but final completion of a clandestine plant would be highly unlikely before the end of 2007.

Given another year to make enough HEU for a nuclear weapon, and a few more months to convert the uranium into weapon components, Iran could have its first nuclear weapon in 2009. By this time, Iran could have had sufficient time to prepare the other components of a nuclear weapon, although the weapon may not be small enough to be deliverable by a ballistic missile.

This result reflects a worst-case assessment for arms control....

Looking at a timeline of at least three years before Iran could have a nuclear weapons capability means that there is still time to pursue aggressive diplomatic options and time for measures such as sanctions to have an effect, if they become necessary.

In the short term, it is imperative for the international community to intensify its efforts to disrupt or slow Iran's ongoing overseas acquisition of dual-use items for its centrifuge program. Iran has encountered greater difficulty acquiring these items because of the increased scrutiny by key supplier states and companies, forcing Iranian smugglers to look elsewhere.

...Although these estimates include significant uncertainties, they reinforce the view that Iran must foreswear any deployed enrichment capability and accept adequate inspections. Otherwise, we risk a seismic shift in the balance of power in the region.

[Some analysts have suggested that Israel's overblown reaction to a border skirmish with Hezbollah in July and August was intended to pave the way for an attack on Iran's nuclear capability. (Seymour Hersh, "Israel may go it alone," "Threat of military action hangs over escalating tensions with Iran," Stephen Zunes, "How Washington goaded Israel into war.") The possibility that the skirmish actually took place on Lebanese soil makes that interpretation even more believable. But such an attack at this time would forgo several years of diplomatic opportunity to resolve the dispute over Iran's nuclear intentions.

Although Albright's estimates support the view that Iran must forswear any deployed enrichment capability and accept unlimited and random inspections under the Additional Protocol, they do not at all suggest that military action will be necessary before the US mid-term elections on November 7. -jlt]

Iran is indeed on the verge of mastering a critical step in building and operating a gas centrifuge plant that would be able to produce enriched uranium for either peaceful or military purposes. However, it can be expected to face serious technical hurdles before it can reliably produce large quantities of enriched uranium. Recommend this Post

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